Azali

Summary

An Azali (Persian: ازلی)[1][2][3][4] or Azali Bábí[5][6] or Bayani (devotee of Religion of Bayan) is a follower of the monotheistic religion of Subh-i-Azal and the Báb. Early followers of the Báb were known as Bábís; however, in the 1860s a split occurred after which the vast majority of Bábís followed Mirza Husayn ʻAli, known as Baháʼu'lláh, and became known as Baháʼís, while the minority who followed Subh-i-Azal, Baháʼu'lláh's half-brother, came to be called Azalis.[2]

Azali Babis continued to push for the end of the Iranian monarchy, and several individuals were among the national reformers of the constitutional revolution of 1905–1911.[7] Azalis stagnated and disappeared as an organized community after the revolution, numbering at most a few thousand by the end of the 20th century, mainly in Iran.[5][6][8] Azalis are considerably outnumbered by adherents of the Baháʼí Faith, who number in the millions.[a] However a reliable Azali Source who is one of Subh al Azal's descendants stated on Qoura: that they are numbered between 15,000 and 25,000 mainly in Iran and some sources stated that maybe they are less than 50,000 mainly in Iran.

Distinguishing characteristics edit

Azalis do not accept any of those who have advanced claims to be the Báb's promised one (known as "He whom God shall make manifest"). The most bitterly contested claim is that of Baháʼu'lláh in 1863. Azalis rejected his claim of divinity as premature, arguing that the world must first accept the laws of the Báb before "He Whom God Shall Make Manifest" can appear.[2]

Involvement in Persian secular and constitutional reform edit

With respect to the direction that Azali Bábism took immediately after the split, MacEoin said:

Azali Babism represents the conservative core of the original Babi movement, opposed to innovation and preaching a religion for a non-clerical gnostic elite rather than the masses. It also retains the original Babi antagonism to the Qajar state and a commitment to political activism, in distinction to the quietist stance of Baháism [sic]. Paradoxically, Azali conservatism in religious matters seems to have provided a matrix within which radical social and political ideas could be propounded.[6]

After the split with the Baháʼís, some Azalis were very active in secular reform movements and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905–1907), including Sheikh Ahmad Rouhi and Mirza Abd-al-Hosayn Kermani. However, the community was still suppressed as a heresy, and the accusation of being an Azali was often enough for most to believe it to be true. Coupled with the Azali practice of taqiyya (dissimulation), determining whether or not a particular figure in Persian politics was an Azali is difficult.[6]

Taqiyya edit

Taqiya ("dissimulation") was practiced by some Bábís. It was justified by some as a response to the often violent oppression the community faced. However, prominent Bábí leaders never encouraged individuals to practice it; and some who had practiced taqiyya later abandoned it, declared themselves openly, and were put to death.[10]

Among Azalis, however, the practice became ingrained and widespread. One historian has noted:

The Azali Babis and in particular Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmani and Shaykh Ahmad Ruhi showed little hesitation in alteration and falsification of Babi teachings and history in their works. Azali Babis regarded taqiyyah as an imperative requirement.
In contrast the Azali Babis glorified taqiyyah in their literature. Taqiyyah was considered a virtue and classified into various levels of concealment. Prominent Azali leaders openly recanted their faith and even abused [the] Bab and Azal in the process.[10]

He whom God Shall make Manifest edit

After Bahaullah claiming to be the Messianic figure of He Whom God Shall Make Manifest (من يظهره الله) Subh al Azal rejected his claim because Bab sayed in his Persian Bayan That this messianic figure shall appear between year Gyiath (غياث) and year Mustaghath (مستغاث) which means in Persian letters numbers the years between year 1501 and 2001 of Bayan (and possibly Hijri because Bab only used Hijri Calendar in his Persian and Arabic Bayan before The Canonization of Bayanic Calendar (beginning with the year 1844 not with lunar year 1 Hijri of 622 AD) in his third Bayan or Kitab Asma' Kull Shay')

So for this reason Subh al Azal and his devotees (Azalis) rejected his claim and they are now awaiting for This Messianic Figure and refuse to accept Bahaullah as the savior of mankind.

Succession and aftermath edit

There was some dispute on the question over who was Subh-i-Azal's appointed successor.[11] MacEoin states that Subh-i-Azal appointed Yahya Dawlatábádí as his successor in turn after the death of his (Yahya's) father, Mirza Hadi Dawlatábádí.[6] However, this was disputed by Subh-i-Azal's grandson, Jalal Azal, indicating that this question was not entirely resolved.[12]

MacEoin notes that, in any event, neither he (Yahya Dawlatábádí) nor anyone else arose to organize the affairs of the community, or produce significant writing to develop the religion. He goes on to say (writing in 1999):

With the deaths of those Azalis who were active in the Constitutional period, Azali Babism entered a phase of stagnation from which it has never recovered. There is now no acknowledged leader nor, to the knowledge of the present writer, any central organization. Members tend to be secretive about their affiliation, converts are rare, and association appears to run along family lines. It is difficult to estimate current numbers, but these are unlikely to exceed one or two thousand, almost all of whom reside in Iran.[6]

Prominent Azalis edit

Despite their small numbers the Azalis have included several prominent Iranian political and literary figures, notably Shaykh Ahmad Ruhi and Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmani.[13]

Notes edit

  1. ^ Browne wrote in 1890: "But the upshot of the whole matter is, that out of every hundred Bábís probably not more than three or four are Ezelís [sic], all the rest accepting Behá'u'lláh [sic] as the final and most perfect manifestation of the Truth."[9][2]

Citations edit

  1. ^ Browne 1890, pp. 351–352.
  2. ^ a b c d Britannica 2011.
  3. ^ MacEoin 2012.
  4. ^ Amanat 1989, p. 384, 414.
  5. ^ a b Barrett 2001, p. 246.
  6. ^ a b c d e f MacEoin 1987.
  7. ^ Warburg 2006, p. 177.
  8. ^ Warburg 2006, pp. 8, 177.
  9. ^ Browne 1890, p. 351.
  10. ^ a b Manuchehri 1999.
  11. ^ Browne 1918, pp. 312–314.
  12. ^ Momen 1991, p. 106.
  13. ^ Smith 2000, p. 54.

References edit

  • Amanat, Abbas (1989). Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ISBN 9780801420986.
  • Barrett, David (2001). The New Believers. London, UK: Cassell & Co. ISBN 0-304-35592-5.
  • Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica (2011-09-28). "Azalī". Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 2021-01-03.
  • Browne, E.G. (1890) [Republished in 1901]. "Bábism". Religious Systems of the World: A Contribution to the Study of Comparative Religion. London: Swann Sonnenschein. pp. 333–53.
  • Browne, E.G., ed. (1918). Materials for the Study of the Babi Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • MacEoin, Denis (1992). The Sources for Early Bābī Doctrine and History. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 90-04-09462-8.
  • MacEoin, Denis M. (1987-12-15) [Updated 18 August 2011]. "AZALI BABISM". Encyclopædia Iranica. Retrieved 2021-01-03.
  • MacEoin, Denis (2012). "Ṣubḥ-i Azal". Encyclopaedia of Islam (Second ed.). doi:10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_7112. Retrieved 2021-01-04.
  • Manuchehri, Sepehr (1999). "The Practice of Taqiyyah (Dissimulation) in the Babi and Bahai Religions". Research Notes in Shaykhi, Babi and Baha'i Studies. 3 (3). Archived from the original on 2 December 2006. Retrieved 2006-12-29.
  • Momen, Moojan (1991). "The Cyprus Exiles". Baháʼí Studies Bulletin: 81–113.
  • Smith, Peter (2000). A Concise Encyclopedia of the Baháʼí Faith. Oxford, UK: Oneworld Publications. ISBN 1-85168-184-1.
  • Warburg, Margit (2006). Citizens of the world: a history and sociology of the Bahaʹis from a globalisation perspective. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 978-90-474-0746-1. OCLC 234309958.