Summary
KN-24, officially the Hwasongpho-11Na (Korean: 《화성포-11나》형; Hancha: 火星砲 11나型; lit. Mars Artillery Type 11Na) (Hwasong-11 improved),[3] is a designation given to a North Korean single-stage, solid-fueled tactical ballistic missile.
| Hwasongpho-11Na, Hwasong-11Na | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Type | Short-range ballistic missile |
| Service history | |
| Used by |  North Korea |
| Production history | |
| Designed | 2019 |
| Specifications | |
| Length | 7.2 metres |
| Diameter | 1.1 metres |
| Warhead | 400–500 kg (880–1,100 lb) |
| Engine | Solid fuel rocket |
Operational range | 410 km (250 mi) |
| Maximum speed | up to 2.1 km/s (Mach 6.2) |
Guidance system | Inertial navigation system (INS), possible satellite navigation |
| Accuracy | 35 m[1] |
Launch platform | tracked or 8×8 wheeled TEL[2] |
Design edit
The KN-24 bears an external resemblance to the American MGM-140 ATACMS and likely fills a similar role of supporting battlefield operations. One difference is that its aft-mounted aerodynamic fins are fixed rather than foldable like those on the ATACMS, requiring deployment from rectangular launch canisters. It flies in a "variable ballistic trajectory," flattening out at a lower altitude (below around 50 km (160,000 ft)) than traditional SRBMs like the Scud where the atmosphere is dense enough so the missile's fins can maintain aerodynamic control over its entire flight and dive toward the target. Use of INS updated with satellite-guidance data could make it accurate to within 100 meters CEP, or 200 meters using INS alone. Although the missile is outwardly similar to the ATACMS, it has demonstrated greater range, suggesting its physical dimensions are larger; it appears to share a common booster with the KN-23 and is estimated to carry a 400–500 kg payload with a unitary or submunition warhead. The KN-24 is likely to replace older liquid-fueled North Korean SRBMs like the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6, as its non-parabolic trajectory makes it more survivable against missile defense systems and its increased accuracy reduces the number of missiles that would be needed to destroy a single target.[4][5][6]
Despite their similarities to the ATACMS system, the KN-24 is significantly larger, and likely uses the same motor as the Pukkuksong-1 with similar jet vanes, and overall resembling a single stage version of it. The launch container has a width of about 1.26 m and a wheel diameter of 0.78 m, similar to the Pukkuksong-2 tracked TEL. A number of images shown of the system appears to be manipulated, significantly increasing the size of the launcher.[7]
With the missile fulfilling a similar role to the KN-23, there should have been no need to develop another missile later with an overlapping performance. However, in an analysis of news reports from the Korean Central News Agency, despite the differences the KN-23 possesses from the 9K720 Iskander, the KN-23 is likely to be constructed with foreign assistance or foreign parts. While all the news reports on the KN-23 mainly focused on the deployment, 'demonstration of power' and newness of it, reports on the KN-24 instead focused on the 'research' and 'development' in its first launch. Later launches of the KN-24 made mention of 'Juche weapons of Korean style', which is not mentioned at all for the KN-23, hinting that whereas the KN-24 underwent a research and development phase, whereas the KN-23 was already deployed prior to being tested and likely having foreign involvement in some form.[8]
In the 'Self-Defence 2021' military exhibition, a beige coloured KN-24 was shown,[7] and revealed the official name of the missile to be Hwasongpho-11Na.[3] Since 나(Na) is second letter in hangul alphabetic order called ganada order, it means this missile is improved version or substitution of Hwasong-11 missile.
History edit
The first KN-24 test firing occurred on 10 August 2019 near the eastern coastal city of Hamhung, with two missiles reaching an apogee of 48 km and a range of 400 km (250 mi) at a speed of 2.1 km/s (7,600 km/h; 4,700 mph).
Six days later on 16 August 2019, two more missiles were launched from Tongchon to an apogee of 30 km and a range of 230 km (140 mi), demonstrating a depressed trajectory.
On 21 March 2020, two more KN-24s were fired from Sonchon to an apogee of 50 km and a range of 410 km, performing "pull-up maneuvers" in flight and one supposedly striking a small 100 meter-long island.[4][5]
On January 17, 2022, two KN-24s were fired from Sunan Airport in Pyongyang. The missiles flew 380 km and achieved an apogee of 42 km with a maximum speed of Mach 5 (1.5 - 1.8 km/s). The test fire was conducted to check operational readiness and validate build quality of mass produced KN-24's.
On February 15, 2024, one KN-24 was shot down in Ukraine, near Kyiv.[9]
On February 16, 2024, Ukrainian data showed 24 missiles of the KN-23 and KN-24 type being used by Russia, with overall low accuracy.[10]
See also edit
- KTSSM – South Korean tactical ballistic missile
References edit
References edit
- ^ North Korean Short Range Systems
- ^ Brief on 27 July 2023 Parade of the DPRK. Open Nuclear Network. 8 August 2023.
- ^ a b "Kim Jong Un speaks at Defence Development Exhibition" (PDF). Pyongyang Times. No. 13014–2180219. October 16, 2021. p. 6.
- ^ a b KN-24. Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- ^ a b Preliminary Assessment of the KN-24 Missile Launches. 38 North. 25 March 2020.
- ^ North Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles: A Technical Evaluation. 38 North. 9 October 2019.
- ^ a b "Pukguksong GLBM-1". www.b14643.de. Retrieved 2021-10-25.
- ^ "A Tale of Two Missiles: Analysis of KCNA Reports on North Korea's KN-23 and KN-24 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles". datayo.org. Archived from the original on 2021-01-15. Retrieved 2021-10-12.
- ^ https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/02/16/7442218/
- ^ Balforth, Tom (February 16, 2024). "Ukrainian data casts doubt on precision of N.Korea missiles fired by Russia". Reuters. Archived from the original on 2024-02-16. Retrieved 2024-02-17.