Managerial_hubris Knowpia

Managerial hubris is the unrealistic belief held by managers in bidding firms that they can manage the assets of a target firm more efficiently than the target firm's current management.

Managerial hubris is one reason top managers, e.g., CEOs^[1] and board directors,^[2] may choose to invest in a merger that on average generates no profits.^[3]

References edit

^ Malmendier, Ulrike; Tate, Geoffrey (2008). "Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction". Journal of Financial Economics. 89 (1): 20–43. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002. S2CID 12354773.
^ Twardawski, Torsten; Kind, Axel (2023). "Board overconfidence in mergers and acquisitions". Journal of Business Research. 165 (1). doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2023.114026.
^ Jay B. Barney and William S. Hesterly (2008). Strategic Management and Competitive Advantages. Pearson Prentice Hall. pp. 380. ISBN 0-13-613520-X.

[1] Malmendier, Ulrike; Tate, Geoffrey (2008). "Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction". Journal of Financial Economics. 89 (1): 20–43. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002. S2CID 12354773.

[2] Twardawski, Torsten; Kind, Axel (2023). "Board overconfidence in mergers and acquisitions". Journal of Business Research. 165 (1). doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2023.114026.

[3] Jay B. Barney and William S. Hesterly (2008). Strategic Management and Competitive Advantages. Pearson Prentice Hall. pp. 380. ISBN 0-13-613520-X.

[1]

[2]

[3]

Summary

See also edit

References edit