Power projection

Summary

Power projection (or force projection or strength projection), in international relations, is the capacity of a state to deploy and sustain forces outside its territory.[1] The ability of a state to project its power into an area may serve as an effective diplomatic lever, influencing the decision-making process and acting as a potential deterrent on other states' behavior.[2][3][4][5]

Aircraft carriers such as the USS Nimitz play an important role in modern power projection.

This ability is a crucial element of a state's power in international relations. Any state able to direct its military forces outside its territory might be said to have some level of power projection capability, but the term itself is used most frequently in reference to militaries with a worldwide reach (or at least significantly broader than a state's immediate area). Even states with sizable hard power assets (such as a large standing army) may only be able to exert limited regional influence so long as they lack the means of effectively projecting their power on a global scale. Generally, only a select few states are able to overcome the logistical difficulties inherent in the deployment and direction of a modern, mechanized military force.[6][7] Allies and partners can take up or share some of the burden of power projection.[8][9][10]

A state might § compete in the gray zone just short of conflict, exercising its soft power, or hard power, in a bid for potential superpower.[11][12]: 1:47 [a] While traditional measures of power projection typically focus on hard power assets (tanks, soldiers, aircraft, naval vessels, etc.), the use of soft power shows that power projection does not necessarily have to actively put military forces in combat, but only potentially.[13] Assets for power projection can often serve dual uses, as the deployment of various countries' militaries during the humanitarian response to the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake illustrates.

HistoryEdit

Early examples of power projection includes Roman dominance of Europe: the ability to project power is tied to the ability to innovate and field such innovations. Roman engineering innovations such as machines (pile driver), concrete, aqueducts and modern roads provided the footing for an economic engine that powered a military that was unmatched in its day. Examples of Roman power projection include Julius Caesar constructing the Rhine bridge in 10 days to demonstrate the ability to march his 40,000 troops as he saw fit: the local inhabitants enjoyed the natural protection of the river and fled when this natural protection was overcome. Although Rome is far from the center of modern power, its influence can be seen in the architecture of modern capitols around the world (domes, arches, columns). The demonstration of an extraordinary innovative military capability will signal power and, when properly applied, terminate conflicts summarily.[citation needed]

During the Ming treasure voyages in the 15th century, the Chinese treasure fleet was heavily militarized to exercise power projection around the Indian Ocean and thereby promote its interests.[14]

The modern ability to project power and exert influence on a global scale can be tied to innovations stemming from the Industrial Revolution and the associated modernizations in technology, communications, finance and bureaucracy; this finally allowed the state to create unprecedented amounts of wealth and to effectively marshal these resources to exert power over long distances.[citation needed]

The first such industrial-technological power was the British Empire in the 19th century. As a maritime power, its strength and ability to project power to further its interests lay in the Royal Navy. A worldwide system of naval bases and coaling stations, a large logistical bureaucracy to oversee shipbuilding, the supply of coal, food, water, and sailors, and an industrial base for the manufacture and technological enhancement of the fleet were among the essential ingredients for this capability. During the First Opium War (1839–1842), it was this capacity that enabled a British expeditionary force of 15 barracks ships, 4 steam-powered gunboats and 25 smaller boats with 4,000 marines to successfully defend its interests 6,000 miles from the fleet's home port.[15]

 
An illustration of the burning of Magdala, an event which took place during the British Expedition to Abyssinia in 1868. The expedition came about as a result of Tewodros II of Ethiopia's imprisonment of European missionaries and officials, and demonstrated the power projection capabilities of the British Empire.

The Anglo-French expeditionary force sent to shore up the Ottoman Empire against Russian aggression during the Crimean War (1853–1856) was one of the first examples of a planned expeditionary power-projection campaign. It was the first campaign to use modern technology, including steam-powered warships and telegraph communications.[citation needed]

Another illustrative example of industrial power projection, was the British Expedition to Abyssinia in 1868 as a retaliation against Emperor Tewodros II of Ethiopia's imprisonment of several missionaries and British government representatives. The expeditionary force sent was a tremendous logistical and technological challenge at the time. Commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Napier of the Bombay Army, military intelligence was used to estimate the required size of the army and the difficulties of traversing the inhospitable terrain.[citation needed]

A force of over 30,000 was shipped from British India to Zula on the Red Sea on a fleet of more than 280 steam ships, while an advance detachment of engineers built a large port with two piers, warehouses and a lighthouse, and constructed a 20-mile-long railway towards the interior.[16] A road was also built for the artillery to be moved along with the help of elephants. After three months of trekking, the British force repelled an Ethiopian attack and launched an artillery bombardment against the fortress of Magdala which led to its capitulation; Tewodros committed suicide.[17][18]

In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, the Japanese destruction of the Imperial Russian Navy's Pacific Fleet demonstrated Imperial Russia's inability to project force in the East. This immediately diminished Russia's diplomatic sway in that region. At the same time, Russia's western armies became less credible, as mobilization exposed organizational flaws and threw the western armies into chaos. This led analysts in Europe, such as German chief of staff Count Alfred von Schlieffen, to conclude that Russia would prove inept at projecting force in Europe, thus demoting Russia in European diplomatic relations.

Many other actions can be considered projections of force. The 19th century is full of incidents such as the 1864 Shimonoseki campaign and the Boxer Rebellion. More recently, the Falklands War provided an example of the United Kingdom's ability to project force far from home. Other recent examples of power projection include the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. The ability of the U.S. Navy, the British Royal Navy, and the French Navy to deploy large numbers of ships for long periods of time away from home are notable projection abilities. See § Power projection capabilities, Putinism.

ElementsEdit

 
The cargo hold and intercontinental flight capabilities of the C-5 Galaxy make it a major asset for deploying military equipment around the globe.

The U.S. Department of Defense defines power projection as the "ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power—political, economic, informational, or military—to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability".[19][20]

As distance between a fighting force and its headquarters increases, command and control inevitably becomes more difficult. Modern-day power projection often employs high-tech communications and information technology to overcome these difficulties, a process sometimes described as the "Revolution in Military Affairs".

While a few long-range weapons such as the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and some unmanned combat aerial vehicles (drones) are capable of projecting deadly force in their own right, it is military logistics that is at the heart of power projection. The ability to integrate naval and air forces with land armies as part of joint warfare is a key aspect of effective power projection; airlift and sealift capabilities facilitate the deployment of soldiers and weapons to a distant theater of war.

The aircraft carrier strike group, strategic bomber, ballistic missile submarine, and strategic airlifter are all examples of power projection platforms. Military units designed to be light and mobile, such as airborne forces (paratroopers and air assault forces) and amphibious assault forces, are utilized in power projection. Forward basing is another method of power projection, which, by pre-positioning military units or stockpiles of arms at strategically located military bases outside a country's territory, reduces the time and distance needed to mobilize them.

TypesEdit

Scholars have disaggregated military power projection into nine different categories based on political goals and level of force. Four of these employ "soft" military power (securing sea lanes of communication, non-combatant evacuation, humanitarian response, and peacekeeping) and the rest are primarily concerned with "hard" military power (show the flag, compellence/deterrence, punishment, armed intervention, and conquest).[21] There is a § continuum in these capabilities.[a]

Soft powerEdit

Examples of soft power projection include:

  • Securing sea lanes of communication: the protection of shipping lanes from attack by hostile states or irregular threats.
  • Non-combatant evacuation operations: the evacuation of citizens or friendly third-country civilians from a foreign country when they are endangered by war or civil unrest.
  • Humanitarian response: the use of military forces abroad to assist in the aftermath of a natural disaster.
  • Peacekeeping: military operations designed to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement to an ongoing dispute.[4][22][23]
  • Establishing trust, as the basis of cooperation among allies and partners[24][25]

Gray zone competitionEdit

This section has been split from US Army Futures Command § Other armies

The gray zone between cooperation and conflict[13] has expanded due to the competition between the power projection capabilities of the world's armies, as well as the economic power of its nations.[26][27][28]

The US, Russia, China, Britain, and France have renounced the use of nuclear weapons in 2022, and going forward.[29] However, in the face of threats of nuclear war (say from Russia, as threatened during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine),[30][b] NATO keeps about 100 B61 nuclear bombs in storage in Europe.[32][33][34][35]: 4:50, 5:55  [36][37]

The British Army is investigating innovations, such as robots and drones,[38] including 70 technologies funded by the £800 million (US$1 billion) Defence Innovation Fund launched in 2016.[39] Two hundred troops will engage in "surveillance, long-range, and precision targeting, enhanced mobility and the re-supply of forces, urban warfare and enhanced situational awareness".[40] The British Army is reducing size by about 10,000 troops as well, by 2025.[41] The British Army will have Integrated Operating Concept (MDI—like MDO) for "gray zone" operations across domains, using a synthetic operating environment, with repeatable hard and soft strike capability.[42] The UK, Germany, and France respectively have established a joint command for space United Kingdom Space Command, a Space Situational Awareness Centre (Germany), and Commandement de l’espace (France).[43]

"By 2020 the Army's programs for modernization were now framed as a decades-long process of cooperation with allies and partners,[44][45] for competition with potential adversaries who historically have blurred the distinction between peace and war"[46]—from: § Reorganization plan of the United States Army

  1. In 2020, one measure of § military power projection ranks the competition between the armies of the world (after the US Army, which is ranked atop this list).[47][48][c][50][51] The list of armies, a mixture of allies, partners, and competitors is estimated to be:
  2. Russia[47] jammed the GPS signal during NATO exercises in November 2018.[52][53][54][d] In 2014 the DoD's research and engineering chief Alan Shaffer warned that the 'US lost dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum'[66] (EMS), in part due to the US government selloff of EMS radio frequencies, and also due in part to the proliferation of digital technologies which allow for low-cost jammers.[66] (See: meaconing)[67][68] General Valery Gerasimov advocates hybrid warfare, a "blend of political, economic and military power to bear against adversaries".[69][70][71] Russia took Crimea without firing a shot.[72][28][e][73][74] In April 2020 Russia tested an anti-satellite system for low earth orbit (LEO) satellites.[75] On 15 November 2021, a Russian anti-satellite test destroyed its Kosmos 1408, endangering its own cosmonauts on the International Space Station, and other satellites in low earth orbit.[76][77][78][79] Cyber attacks on the whole of the US government via Supply_chain_attack § Whole of government began in March 2020, but only reached the attention of the news media on 14 December 2020.[80][81] Russia is mapping the undersea cables which bear the majority of the communications traffic[d] between the US and Europe.[82][83][84]
    • On 25 December 2021 President Putin disclosed that Russia would be unable to defend itself against missiles launched against Moscow from Ukraine; their flight times would be four to five minutes, according to him.[85] However, Putin did not acknowledge that the West's Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania are for defense against ballistic missiles, and not the Tomahawk missiles which he named in his statement.[12] See: A-135 anti-ballistic missile system, A-235 anti-ballistic missile system, S-400 missile system, S-500 missile system To prove that Aegis Ashore is defensive only, inspection of the sites in Poland and Romania have been offered to Russia.[86]
    •  
      2014 map of line separating Ukrainian and Russian-backed forces
      Ukraine had a trench network on its border with Russia, in a standoff as of April 2021.[87][88][89][90][91][92][93] A border exercise involving 110,000 Russian troops on the Ukraine border[94][95] has pulled back; however hundreds of armored vehicles, including tanks are remaining one hundred miles from Donbas (colloquial for Donets basin)[96] in spite of a partial armor pullback.[97][98] Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OCSE) drones which are monitoring the line between Ukrainian troops and the Donbas separatists are seeing jamming of their drone's dual GPS receivers, with tens of thousands of infantry troops remaining on the Ukrainian border.[94] The OSCE has provided a map of the line dividing the Ukrainian forces and the Russian-backed forces.[99][100] As of 18 February 2022 there were up to 190,000 troops along Ukraine's borders;[101] after recognizing the separatist states of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, Moscow is moving troops over the border of Russia into the Donetsk and Luhansk areas, and establishing military bases there.[102] This troop movement triggered sanctions on five Russian banks and three individuals, on 22 February 2022.[103][101][104][e] (See 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine which began 24 February 2022)
      • Andrei Illarionov cites Pavel Felgengauer, who projects a scenario by which Russia can create a 'Novorossia' (see § CSIS figures 2a-2c)[105] stretching across Southern Ukraine to Transnistria (Moldova) after a gas pipeline to the EU is completed (September 2021).[106] If the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline were to be weaponized by holding the liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply to Western Europe hostage, the US is countering this threat with contingency plans to redirect LNG supplies from the rest of the world.[107][108][109] Germany has agreed to safeguard Ukraine, as well.[110][111][112][113][f][107][118] See 2022 Nord Stream pipeline sabotage —26 September 2022
      • Cyber attacks on Ukrainian government websites are occurring in January 2022.[119][120] Frida Ghitis and Richard Galant point out that the muddy season that ends winter would bog down an armored invasion.[121][122][106] US Army Lieutenant Colonel Alex Vershinen points out that if the Russian Army were to attempt a quick fait accompli and then dig in, its logistical capability would be insufficient to complete a large land grab, as its logistic capabilities are largely based on railroads, but not trucks.[123][124] Russia's logistic capability without railroads is 90 miles, without replenishment;[123] thus Sebastien Roblin suggests that a "short, victorious war" by Russia (as in the 12-day war with Georgia in 2008), with stipulations largely resembling its current diplomatic demands, namely installation of pro-Russian leadership, Ukraine's withdrawal from the path of joining NATO etc., coupled with the expedient of bypassing Russian control of Kyiv's population, might avoid Russia's getting bogged down in Ukraine.[125] This calculation could get up-ended by a longer war,[e][g] with determined resistance in Ukraine,[130][131] via guerilla warfare,[132][133] as in Afghanistan (1979-1989), which indirectly ended the Soviet Union.[134] Within two months of the beginning of the First Chechen War, an antiwar movement arose in Russia.[123][135]
        • On 22 February 2022 historian Sergey Radchenko recalled a vignette from September 1945, during the post World War II Potsdam Conference negotiations on the division of world power at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers, when Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov asked U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes whether he carried the atomic bomb in his side pocket, to which Byrnes threatened Molotov to stop stalling, or else Byrnes would pull the atomic bomb out of his pocket and use it on Molotov (laughter). Molotov was guided by Stalin's directive "It is clear that you must display complete obduracy".[136] (See Proxy war)
    • Russia and Belarus began Zapad 2021, a 200,000-troop exercise held every four years.[137][138] The Pripyat marshes would bog down an armored invasion through Belarus.[122]: 2:22 [e]
    • In the opinion of James Stavridis, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine is showing that Special Forces, unmanned systems, and Cyber will become far more important in the future.[139]
    • In 2021 Russia spent 2.7 percent of its GDP on defense, a level which is expected to drop to 2.3 percent by 2023, as part of a mandate to boost domestic production.[140]
      • Unmanned ground combat vehicles (UGCVs), among them Uran-6, Uran-9 (Уран-9), and Uran-14 are entering service in the Russian Army as of 2021. Uran-6 is a mine flail; Uran-14 is an unmanned firefighting vehicle. Uran-9s are semi-autonomous robotic combat vehicles; specialists can operate them using mobile control stations.[141] Their first attempted service was in Syria. Analysts from BAE Systems (UK) assessed the Uran-9s in Syria as unreliable, with their radio-controls sometimes blocked by buildings; their sensors and guidance were unstabilized.[142] An armed Uran-9 weighs 12 tons,[142] and measures 5 meters long, which is a fifth of the weight and half the length of a T-90 tank.[143] Each Uran-9 control system operates at ranges up to 1.8 miles from the UGVs;[144]: min 1:00 [145]: minute 2:20  each control system currently (2021) guides 4 UGVs, in a leader-follower configuration.[143][141][146] Uran-9 was used in the Vostok 2018 exercises in 2018. At least 20 Uran-9 UGCVs exist.[146][141]
      • Russia's defense ministry has signed a contract to field the Tsirkon hypersonic missiles to its troops in 2025.[147]
      • During the 2021 negotiations for defusing the Ukraine-Russia confrontation, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has warned that its 9M729 nuclear-capable cruise missile, which is already deployed in the European part of Russia, might be further employed there.[148][b]
      • The hypersonic Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, and 3M22 Zircon (Tsirkon) are standoff strike weapons, for keeping adversaries at bay; they are land-based, and sea-based respectively.[149][b]
    • On 1 September 2022 Russia, China, India, and 11 other nations began a scaled-down Vostok 2022 (East 2022).[150] Vostok will exercise 50,000 troops, down from 300,000 in 2018. India is contributing 75 troops. [150]
    • By 19 October 2022 NATO nations were providing winter equipment to Ukraine.[151] By Spring 2023 the US industrial base can be providing 20,000 rounds of 155mm howitzer munitions per month to Ukraine.[152]
  3. China[47]—RAND simulations show Blue losses.[153] Six of the top 15 defense companies in the world are now Chinese, in 2019 for the first time.[154] The competition with China was shaped in the decade 2010–2020, according to David Kriete.[155][156][157]
    • Secretary Mark Esper said that China is aiming to be the dominant military power in Asia by 2049.[158][159][160] The 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) of China's ruling party, aims to accelerate the army's modernization and informationization, in order to improve national security for 2027 (100th anniversary of its ruling party), according to Dean Cheng.[161][162] By 2023 China's working-age demographic (a shrinking labor force/ capital savings rate) will start to work against the Party's aspiration for 2027,[163][164][165][h] which, according to Xi Jinping's plan, is for China's military to reach parity with the US military in 2027.[167]
    • The International Federation of Robotics reports that China has been the world leader in implementing industrial robots for the past eight years; in 2020 China used almost half the world's industrial robots.[168]
      • The takeover of a UK semiconductor fab by a Chinese-owned firm has been blocked on national security grounds.[169]
    • In 2017 China adopted the National Intelligence Law which obligates Chinese companies to subordinate themselves to intelligence-gathering measures for the state.[170] China is militarizing the South China Sea.[74] In 2020 a match-up of the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning (a rebuilt aircraft cruiser) versus the supercarrier USS Ronald Reagan is assessed to give the Ronald Reagan air superiority within one hour.[171]
    • The 3rd generation GPS network of BeiDou satellites (BDS-3) was completed in July 2020 with the launch of the 30th BDS-3 satellite.[172] The 30th BDS-3 satellite, meant to complete China's own global navigation satellite system,[173] had been previously postponed.[174] See Restrictions on geographic data in China
    • Satellite images of 4 June 2021 reveal an estimated 250 additional missile silos under construction near Yumen, China, warn specialists at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.[175]
    • The Defense Intelligence Agency projects that China will at least double its nuclear arsenal and that its production capability will be far expanded in the 2020s.[176][177][178][179]
    • China controls 80% of world rare earth mineral production, and routinely floods this market when other nations attempt to ramp up their own rare earth production.[180][181][182]
      • The tech leaders of China are being enlisted to aid 'Socialism with Chinese characteristics' by pledging part of their wealth to 'common prosperity'.[183] The Cyberspace Administration of China is regulating algorithms on its financial reporting websites which republish foreign financial journalists.[184]
    • Chinese cyber groups are attacking Russia, reports Ben Watson.[185][186] China is accelerating its timeline to take Taiwan.[187][188]
    • 149 Chinese fighters and bombers swept over Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 1–4 October 2021.[189][190][191] Taiwan has countered with Civil Air Patrol warnings.[189][192][190][193][194]
    • China is implementing its plan for 2027: Office of Secretary of Defense (3 Nov 2021) "Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China", Annual report to Congress [195] [166]: 38:30  [196][e][i][j]
      • By November 2022 a strict zero-Covid lockdown policy instituted in 2020 had led to 2022 COVID-19 protests in China; China then allowed use of a locally-developed mRNA vaccine (2 December 2022), in lieu of lockdowns.[212][213][214]
  4. India: faces Pakistan;[47][215][181] Pakistan can be supplied with Turkey's drones (such as the Bayraktar TB2), which were used with great effect by Azerbaijan against Armenian tanks and Armenian air defense[216] during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. In 2010 China deployed 11,000 troops in Gilgit, near Kashmir.[217]
    • Japan and India have agreed to enhance their bilateral defense cooperation (9 September 2022).[218]
  5. Japan: faces North Korea;[47][219] Japan has expressed interest in developing its own F-X fighter program;[220] Brian Burton notes that interoperable materiel is needed for allies and partners of the US, and that the US could constructively influence Japan's impending 20-year development effort with lessons learned from UAVs and air defense, for example.[220] On 26 December 2019, at Putin's annual news conference with foreign media, Hirofumi Sugizaki, a Japanese journalist asked about the end of the INF Treaty and the cooperation of Russia and China on an anti-missile system. Putin characterized the anti-missile system as defensive, and the relation of US and Russia as a 'draw' (ヒキワケ—hikiwake).[221][222][196][135][166] Japan will compensate companies for not disclosing patents with military applications.[223] In a Joint test, Japan's Cooperative Engagement Capability allowed JS Maya to detect and track a ballistic missile; JS Haguro shot it down.[224]

Applications of power projectionEdit

The Texas National Security Review projects five scenarios for the global economy:[225]

  1. Reglobalization as in the 1980s
  2. Deglobalization away from the trends of the 2000s[226]
  3. Globalization with Chinese characteristics
  4. Regional blocs with partially closed trading[116][a][228][k][230][231]
  5. Shared strategic interests and common political values, which Friedberg judges will be the choice of the Western bloc[225] and its direction for power projection.[f]

Hard powerEdit

Examples of hard power projection include:

  • Showing the flag: the symbolic deployment of military forces to a region for the purposes of demonstrating political interest, resolve, or willingness to take more forceful military action.
  • Compulsion/deterrence: the use of the threat of military force against another state to either induce it into or dissuade it from pursuing a given policy. In this form, power projection acts as a diplomatic tool, attempting to influence the decision-making process of foreign actors.[232][233][234][235][236] See Power projection#Gray zone competition for context
  • Punishment: the punitive use of force against another state in response to their pursuit of a given policy.[a]
  • Armed intervention: the movement of military forces into another nation's territory for the purposes of influencing the internal affairs of the target country short of outright conquest.[115][237][238][239][118]
  • Conquest: the offensive use of military assets to forcibly occupy territory controlled or claimed by another state.[117][240][241][242] [243][244][245][246] In 2022 Michael Kofman projected that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would be eastward via Donbas, northward from Crimea, and up the Dnieper river to encircle Ukraine's capital Kyiv,[247][248] with a political takeover of Ukraine a likely objective of Russian leadership.[115][117][249][250][7][251][252][118][253] However, in lieu of a political takeover,[135] a decapitation strike is a possible tactic.[254][255][256][114][257]

Power projection capabilitiesEdit

Power projection capabilities
Country Bloc/Group Maritime
force
Helicopter/aircraft
carriers
active
Overseas
bases
Troops deployed
in operations abroad
Nuclear
deterrence
  Australia G20/MIKTA/FVEY/Commonwealth/APEC/ANZUS/MNNA/QUAD/AUKUS Green-water navy 2 / 0 1 2900[258]  N
  Argentina G20/UNASUR/UFC/Mercosur/MNNA/Rio 0 2 1050[259]  N
  Bangladesh D-8/BIMSTEC/SAARC/IMCTC/Commonwealth of Nations 0 0 6417[260]  N
  Belgium EU/NATO 0 0 710[259] Nuclear sharing
  Brazil G20/G4/BRICS/UNASUR/Mercosur/MNNA/Rio Green-water navy 1 / 0 0 273[261]  N
  Canada G20/G7/NATO/APEC/FVEY/Commonwealth/UFC Green-water navy 0 0 3600[262]  N
  China P5/G20/BRICS/APEC/SCO Blue-water navy 2 / 2 1 11,775[259][263]  Y
  Egypt African Union/Arab League/D-8/MNNA 2 / 0 0 3760[261]  N
  France P5/G20/G7/EU/NATO/Quint Blue-water navy 3 / 1 10 10,300[264]  Y
  Germany G20/G7/G4/EU/NATO/Quint Green-water navy 0 1 3450[265] Nuclear sharing
  India G20/BRICS/G4/Commonwealth/SAARC/SCO/QUAD Blue-water navy 2 / 2 8 6430[261]  Y
  Indonesia G20/ASEAN/APEC/UFC/D-8 0 0 3064[261]  N
  Italy G20/G7/UFC/EU/NATO/Quint Blue-water navy 0 / 2 2 6000[266] Nuclear sharing
  Japan G20/G7/G4/APEC/MNNA/QUAD Green-water navy 2 / 2 1 278[259]  N
  Mexico G20/MIKTA/APEC/UFC 0 0  N
  Netherlands EU/NATO Green-water navy 0 0 650[259] Nuclear sharing
  Nigeria African Union/OPEC/Commonwealth/D-8 0 0 2190[259]  N
  Pakistan D-8/ UFC/SCO/MNNA/SAARC/IMCTC/Commonwealth 0 1 5264[261]  Y
  Poland EU/NATO 0 0 3000[259]  N
  Russia P5/G20/BRICS/SCO/EAEU/APEC/CSTO/CIS Blue-water navy 0 / 1 10 48,500[259]  Y
  Saudi Arabia G20/Opec/OIC/Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf/Arab League 0 0  N
  South Africa G20/BRICS/African Union/Commonwealth 0 0 1171[261]  N
  South Korea G20/APEC/MIKTA/UFC/MNNA Green-water navy 1 / 0 0 1008[259]  N
  Spain EU/NATO/UFC Green-water navy 0 / 1 0 1500[259]  N
  Turkey G20/D-8/MIKTA/NATO/UFC Green-water navy 1 / 0 12[267] 60,000+ [268] Nuclear sharing
  United Kingdom P5/G20/G7/FVEY/NATO/Quint/FPDA/Commonwealth/AUKUS Blue-water navy 0 / 2 15 15,000  Y
  United States P5/G20/G7/NATO/APEC/FVEY/Quint/ANZUS/QUAD/Rio/AUKUS Blue-water navy 11 / 11 38 130,000  Y

See alsoEdit

NotesEdit

  1. ^ a b c d In the view of Larry Fink, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the disruption of their supply chains show that companies and governments in regional blocs will have "to reevaluate their dependencies and reanalyze their manufacturing and assembly footprints".[227]
  2. ^ a b c When asked about countering tactical nuclear weapons which Russia might possibly use against Ukraine, Mark Esper the US' 27th secretary of defense suggested that US and NATO allies agree to put an 'air cap' over Ukraine, to counter any Russian aircraft capable of delivering a tactical nuclear bomb (most likely a 1-10 kTon gravity bomb, or via Iskander cruise missile), and to warn Russia not to fly such an aircraft at Ukraine.[31]: min 1:30 
  3. ^ The US Army's unclassified Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept is "the combined arms employment of capabilities from all domains that create and exploit relative advantages to defeat enemy forces, achieve objectives and consolidate gains during competition, crisis, and armed conflict".[49]
  4. ^ a b "All types of Russian precision munitions are seeing high failure rates".[55] Connectivity to GLONASS is a factor in the lack of Russian PGM availability,[56] [57] and the use of 3G/4G cell towers for Russian encrypted communications (Era) [58] at the beginning of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.[59] "On February 24, 2022 between 5 and 9 AM, just as Russian forces were starting their missile attacks, hackers targeted satellite modems that communicate with Viasat's KA-SAT".[60]: min 15:01  This weakness was unearthed during the use of open communication ("Russian commanders are sometimes piggybacking on Ukrainian cell phone networks to communicate")[61] when FSB was discussing the deaths of their generals: Vitaly Gerasimov, killed 7 Mar 2022;[62] Andrei Sukhovetsky, killed 28 Feb 2022.[63][56] [64][65]
  5. ^ a b c d e In light of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine which began 24 February 2022, earlier assumptions of the truth of public statements about the situation up to that time were reassessed. The speed of the logistical response of the partners in the NATO alliance when funnelling aid like Bayraktar TB2s to Ukraine is instructive. By 7 April 2022, "the U.S. and allies have provided [Ukraine] 60,000 anti-tank weapons and 25,000 anti-aircraft weapons"—Gen. Mark Milley.[197][196] By 31 October 2022, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine had slowed due to the rainy season.[198][135][166]: minute 8:10 
  6. ^ a b In 2022 Russia's actions against Ukraine alerted 'the West' (that is, Europe, and its NATO partners) to the threat to Europe's food and energy supply.[114][115] After the 2008 war in Georgia, and the 2014 takeover of Crimea and Donbas in Ukraine,[12]: 2:42  a political takeover of Ukraine is a likely objective of Russian leadership.[115][116][117]
  7. ^ Russia's invasion was countered by $100 billion in logistical aid to Ukraine, Feb-Dec 2022; however the aid is becoming constrained by the capacity of the US's industrial base to surge production.[126] The invasion is causing materiel shortages in Russia.[127] The surge in aid to Ukraine is causing NATO to acquire more interoperable materiel from a global industrial base, for more integrated deterrence across the NATO alliance against its adversaries.[128] [129]
  8. ^ During the DoD secretary's review of the 7th monthly meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, Gen. Mark Milley was pressed for an assessment of the CCP's readiness for war; Gen. Milley reminded the press that the PLA had not fought a war since 1979; that China's GDP was being harvested for materiel, and that the US military would remain atop the world's armies as long as the US GDP remained strong.[166]: 38:30 
  9. ^ Andrew Eversden (17 Dec 2021) Here's the Army's 24 programs in soldiers’ hands by 2023
    1. Precision Strike Missile (§ PrSM)
    2. Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA)
    3. Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (§ LRHW)
    4. Mid-range capability (§ MRC) missile
    5. Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV)
    6. Robotic Combat Vehicle (§ RCV)
    7. Mobile Protective Firepower (§ MPF)
    8. Future Unmanned Aircraft Systems/ Future Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (FUAS)/(FTUAS)[199]
    9. Integrated Tactical Network (§ ITN) unified with § echelons above brigade, and the multi-domain task forces
    10. Common Operating Environment: Command Post Computing Environment[200]/Mounted Computed Environment (CPCE)/(MCE) See Common operational picture
    11. Command Post Integrated Infrastructure (CPI2)
    12. Mounted Assured Positioning, Navigation, and Timing System (MAPS)[201][202]
    13. Dismounted Assured Positioning, Navigation, and Timing System (DAPS)[201]
    14. Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) using high-energy lasers
    15. Indirect Fires Protection Capability: Iron Dome
    16. Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (§ LTAMDS)[203] - Patriot radar replacement
    17. Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (§ IBCS)
    18. Directed Energy Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD)[204] High energy lasers
    19. Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW)
    20. Integrated Visual Augmentation System (IVAS)
    21. Enhanced Night Vision Goggle – Binocular (ENVG-B)
    22. Reconfigurable Virtual Collective Trainer (RVCT) - Synthetic training environment
    23. IVAS Squad Immersive Virtual Trainer (SiVT) - Synthetic training environment
    24. One World Terrain/ Training Management Tools/ Training Simulation Software (OWT) / (TMT) / (TSS) - Synthetic training environment
    [205][206][207][208]
  10. ^ In Future Vertical Lift, FARA and FLRAA are projected to be prototyped by 2028, with fielding by 2030.[209][210] The OMFV prototype is projected for 2025.[211]
  11. ^ Peter Zeihan's (16 Mar 2022) prediction over the next few decades: End of globalization, breakdown into regional blocs[229]

ReferencesEdit

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  49. ^ Jen Judson (23 Mar 2022) Multidomain operations concept will become doctrine this summer
  50. ^ Zamone Perez (18 Oct 2022) US military in decline, threats from China 'formidable', report says Heritage Foundation report for the case of 2 major wars (as opposed to 1.5 wars, rated as Favorable)
  51. ^ C. Todd Lopez, DOD News (18 Oct 2022) U.S. Can Support Ukraine While Meeting Its Own Security Commitments
  52. ^ (4 November 2018) Russia Jammed GPS During Major NATO Military Exercise With US Troops
  53. ^ Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. (6 June 2019) Army Fields Anti-Jam GPS In Germany This Fall
  54. ^ Russia has figured out how to jam U.S. drones in Syria, officials say
  55. ^ Tara Copp (25 Mar 2022) Russian Forces Halt Kyiv Advance as Kremlin Says Donbass Was Only Goal All Along "Pentagon official rebuts Moscow's claims about war aims, casualties; adds that Russian precision munitions are failing at high rates". (20 to 60 %)
  56. ^ a b Jamie Ross, who cites Christo Grozev of Bellingcat: (Tue, March 8, 2022, 5:32 AM) (7 March 2022) Russian Officer Complains About Dead General and Comms Meltdown in Intercepted Call FSB (Federal Security Service, successor agency to the KGB) officers discuss Gerasimov's death amid the destruction of 3G/4G cell towers in Ukraine, and the loss of Russian encrypted communications (Era), which compromised the FSB officer's sim-card-enabled phone call.
  57. ^ Tobias Naegele (27 Nov 2022) Q&A: The New Chief of Space Operations on Empowering the Force "one B-2 hits 80 independent targets because of GPS".—Gen. B.Chance Saltzman, Space Force
  58. ^ Rob Waugh (8 Mar 2022) 'Idiots': Russian military phone calls hacked after own soldiers destroy 3G towers 3G/4G Towers Needed For Russian encrypted communications (Era)
  59. ^ Caroline Vakil (25 Mar 2022) US officials say Russia behind hack of Ukrainian satellite communications at invasion start: report Apparently GRU-instigated: 'compromise of tens of thousands of satellite modems provided by Viasat's KA-SAT service' at the beginning of the invasion
  60. ^ Not What You Think (25 Mar 2022) Are Tanks Obsolete? The Future of Warfare
  61. ^ Mehul Srivastava, Madhumita Murgia, and Hannah Murphy, Financial Times (3/9/2022, 8:33 AM) The secret US mission to bolster Ukraine’s cyber defences ahead of Russia’s invasion European official: "instead of communicating solely through encrypted military-grade phones, Russian commanders are sometimes piggybacking on Ukrainian cell phone networks to communicate, at times simply by using their Russian cell phones. 'The Ukrainians love it—there is so much data in simply watching these phones, whether or not they are using encrypted apps,' he said. The Ukrainians then block Russian phones from their local networks at key moments, further jamming their communications. 'Then you suddenly see Russian soldiers grabbing cell phones off Ukrainians on the street, raiding repair shops for sims,' he said. 'This is not sophisticated stuff. It’s quite puzzling."
  62. ^ Rob Picheta and Jack Guy, CNN (8 Mar 2022) Ukraine claims Russian general has been killed in Kharkiv
  63. ^ Doug Cunningham (3 Mar 2022) Ukraine forces say Chechen commander Magomed Tushayev killed near Kyiv
  64. ^ MSNBC Morning Joe (28 Mar 2022) 'Astounding' Number Of Casualties: Why The Invasion Is Proving Deadly For Russia
  65. ^ Elizabeth Howell, Space.com (14 Apr 2022) Russia Is Jamming GPS Satellite Signals In Ukraine, US Space Force Says "When four satellites are available, GPS receivers can use their signals to calculate the user's position, often to within just a few feet" —Navstar being jammed
  66. ^ a b Sydney Freedberg, Jr. (3 September 2014) US Has Lost ‘Dominance In Electromagnetic Spectrum’: Shaffer
  67. ^ Stephen Clark (25 November 2019) Russia launches space surveillance satellite Kosmos 2542, in a polar orbit—"[To] monitor the condition of other Russian satellites in orbit."
  68. ^ Joseph Trevithick (30 January 2020) A Russian "Inspector" Spacecraft Now Appears To Be Shadowing An American Spy Satellite USA 245 is a KH-11 series satellite; Cosmos 2542 is now tailing the USA 245's movements with a precision of 150 to 300 kilometers. See Hall thruster
  69. ^ Andrew E. Kramer (2 March 2019) Russian General Pitches ‘Information’ Operations as a Form of War
  70. ^ Paul McCleary (30 May 2019) Dunford: Leaders Mull First NATO Strategy In Decades
  71. ^ Neil Hauer (26 February 2020) Russia may have met its match in Libya Is unable to tip the balance, as it has in Syria. So Russia is escalating its involvement.
  72. ^ Andrew Goodman (26 Apr 2022) Putin the Planner Worked alongside Putin when he was Deputy Mayor of St. Petersberg. "Whatever happens on the ground now, there is good reason to think that Putin will continue to pursue a solution on his terms as long as he remains in power".
  73. ^ Clare Sebastian and Chris Liakos, CNN (20 Apr 2022) Russian billionaire Oleg Tinkov blasts Putin's 'insane war' in Ukraine
  74. ^ a b Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. (21 April 2020) COVID-19: Army Futures Command Takes Wargames Online
  75. ^ Aaron Bateman (22 May 2020) As Russia stalks US satellites, a space arms race may be heating up
  76. ^ Theresa Hitchens (15 November 2021) Russian suspected ground-launched ASAT test scatters dangerous debris through LEO
    • (16 November 2021) Surprise Russian ASAT test shows need to ‘scale’ space tracking, LeoLabs says
  77. ^ Specialist website Russian Space Web (25 Nov 2021) Russia launches classified military satellite
  78. ^ Vladimir Isachenkov, The Associated Press (9 Aug 2020) Russia warns it will see any incoming missile as nuclear
  79. ^ Mark B. Schneider (19 Sep 2020) Will Russia Further Lower Its Nuclear Weapons Use Threshold?
  80. ^ Eric Geller https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/14/massively-disruptive-cyber-crisis-engulfs-multiple-agencies-445376 (14 Dec 2020) 'Massively disruptive' cyber crisis engulfs multiple agencies]
  81. ^ Ellen Nakashima & Craig Timberg (14 Dec 2020) Russian government hackers are behind a broad espionage campaign that has compromised U.S. agencies, including Treasury and Commerce Identified as SVR /APT29 /Cozy Bear, according to FireEye. Breached using the update server of SolarWinds, its Orion Platform, versions released in Mar & Jun 2020.
    • Catalin Cimpanu (14 Dec 2020) SolarWinds Says 18,000 Customers Were Impacted by Recent Hack
    • Dan Goodin (14 Dec 2020) ~18,000 organizations downloaded backdoor planted by Cozy Bear hackers
  82. ^ Lorne Cook (30 May 2021) As Russia tensions simmer, NATO conducts massive war games
    • Thomas Newdick (11 Nov 2021) Norwegian Undersea Surveillance Network Had Its Cables Mysteriously Cut
  83. ^ Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen and Gwladys Fouche, Reuters (16 Nov 2022) NATO allies wake up to Russian supremacy in the Arctic
  84. ^ John Christianson (5 Dec 2022) FIGHTING AND WINNING IN THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM (EMS)
  85. ^ Vladimir Isachenkov, The Associated Press (26 Dec 2021) Putin to mull options if West refuses guarantees on Ukraine
  86. ^ Heather Mongilio (2 Feb 2022) U.S. Offered Russians Aegis Ashore Inspections to Ease Ukraine Tensions; More American Troops Headed to Europe
  87. ^ Matthew Chance (12 Apr 2021) Ukraine's President heads to the trenches as Russia masses its troops Troops and armor are massing by rail, within Russia's border.
  88. ^ ZEYNEP BILGINSOY (10 Apr 2021) The leaders of Ukraine, Turkey stress territorial integrity Donbass and Crimea are disputed.
  89. ^ The Associated Press (12 Apr 2021) Blinken heads to Brussels for talks on Afghanistan, Ukraine SecDef Lloyd Austin will attend.
  90. ^ Lara Seligman and Natasha Bertand (04/12/2021) Can Ukraine deploy U.S.-made weapons against the Russians? FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missiles barely overmatch Uran-9s
  91. ^ Lara Seligman (03/31/2021) Pentagon ‘watching’ as Russia steps up aggression in Eastern Europe A ceasefire between the Ukraine Army and Donetsk separatists ended Jun 2020. EUCOM's V Corps has been on pre-planned maneuvers, but in a NATO partner's territory as of April 2021.
  92. ^ Vivian Salama in Kyiv and William Mauldin in Washington (18 Jan 2022) U.S. Aims Sanctions at Pro-Russian Agents as Blinken Plans Ukraine, Russia Meetings
  93. ^ Robert Burns (19 Jan 2022) Explainer: What are US military options to help Ukraine?
  94. ^ a b Paul McLeary (7 May 2021) Jamming Strikes OSCE Drones Tracking Russian Forces
  95. ^ Olivia Gazis (22 Apr 2021)) After Putin's warning to West, Russia begins large-scale military exercises in and around Ukraine
  96. ^ Nils Adler, Laura King Los Angeles Times (21 Jan 2022) In eastern Ukraine, trench warfare grinds on against backdrop of invasion fears
    • Greg Ganske (22 Jan 2022) Opinion: Why would war in Ukraine matter to the United States?
  97. ^ Kramer, Andrew E.; Troianovski, Anton; Jakes, Lara (2021-04-22). "Russia Orders Partial Pullback From Ukraine Border Region". The New York Times. Moscow and Kyiv. ISSN 0362-4331.
  98. ^ Jim Garamone, DOD News (14 Jan 2022) Russia Trying to Develop Pretext for Ukraine Invasion, DOD Official Says
  99. ^ Michael Schwirtz New York Times (6 Dec 2021) On Ukrainian Front, Grinding War and Weary Anticipation of Invasion Map of "Approximate line separating Ukrainian and Russian-backed forces"
  100. ^ New York Times Ukraine map (7 Jan 2022) How Russia's Military is Positioned To Threaten Ukraine
  101. ^ a b Jeff Schogol, Paul Szoldra (21 Feb 2022) Moscow orders Russian troops into Ukraine
  102. ^ Reuters (22 February 2022) Putin gets green light to deploy troops to eastern Ukraine
  103. ^ Charles Riley (22 February 2022) The sanctions that could really hurt Russia
  104. ^ Charles Riley (22 February 2022) Russia is already paying a hefty financial price for its aggression
  105. ^ Ryan Pickrell (25 Jan 2022) Russian forces are massing on Ukraine's border. Here's what Russia watchers think could be Putin's next big move. Figures 2a-2c CSIS scenarios
  106. ^ a b Andrei Illarionov (30 April 2021) Putin was not ready to launch a war in the Spring
  107. ^ a b Rick Rouan, Courtney Subramanian, Joey Garrison and David Jackson, USA Today (22 February 2022) Biden levels sanctions on Russia for beginning an invasion of Ukraine: live updates
  108. ^ natasha Bertrand (23 Jan 2022) US putting together 'global' strategy to increase gas production if Russia invades Ukraine, officials say
  109. ^ Charles Riley (26 Jan 2022) What is SWIFT and why it might be the weapon Russia fears most
  110. ^ Deutsche Welle (27 Feb 2022) Germany commits €100 billion to defense spending Scholz: Germany has now agreed to a one-time $113 billion increase in its defense budget.
  111. ^ Christian Datoc (15 July 2021) US lifted Nord Stream 2 sanctions to gain German cooperation in safeguarding Ukraine, Biden says
  112. ^ Alexander Ratz and Pavel Polityuk (17 Jan 2022) Germany says Russia will pay price if it moves on Ukraine
  113. ^ Binkov (26 Jan 2022) What might happen if Russia does attack Ukraine? Ukraine is outgunned. Russia would likely stop when resistance stiffens, in Spring 2022. Europe would be divided over heating supplies for impending winter. Ties between Russia and China would strengthen as Europe sanctions its trade with Russia due to war.
  114. ^ a b Rob Picheta (29 Jan 2022) How a Russian invasion of Ukraine would reverberate around the world
  115. ^ a b c d Leaders: (29 Jan 2022) A war in Ukraine could have global consequences "The likelihood of China invading Taiwan would surely rise."
  116. ^ a b Michael Kofman (Apr 2019) Drivers of Russian Grand Strategy
  117. ^ a b c CaspianReport (29 Jan 2022) What a Russian assault on Ukraine would look like video clip 14:41
  118. ^ a b c Jessie Yeung, Adam Renton, Rob Picheta, Ed Upright, Aditi Sangal, Adrienne Vogt and Melissa Macaya, CNN (23 Feb 2022) The latest on the Ukraine-Russia crisis Situation
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  120. ^ Howard Altman (19 Jan 2022) Russian attack could happen 'any minute' Ukraine official says
  121. ^ Frida Ghitis (13 Jan 2022) Putin's big miscalculation
  122. ^ a b Richard Galant (23 Jan 2022) Putin confronts the mud of Ukraine
  123. ^ a b c US Army Lieutenant Colonel Alex Vershinen (23 Nov 2021) Feeding the Bear: A Closer Look at Russian Army Logistics and the Fait Accompli
  124. ^ Matthew Chance, Kylie Atwood, Emmet Lyons and Ami Kaufman, CNN (19 Jan 2021) Ukraine warns Russia has 'almost completed' build-up of forces near border
    • (10 Apr 2021) Russia Sets Up Army Field Hospital Near Ukraine; Moves Iskander Missiles and Amphibious Landing Craft From Caspian Sea to Ukraine Coast!
  125. ^ Eric Schmitt, Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper (7 Apr 2022) Russia Is Recruiting Mercenaries and Syrians to Ukraine, Western Officials Say
  126. ^ Joe Gould (21 Nov 2022) Weapons shortages spark tough choices for Ukraine’s allies
  127. ^ Stephen Fidler and Ann M. Simmons (22 Nov 2022) Russia’s Munitions Shortages Raise Questions Over How Long It Can Continue Ukraine War
  128. ^ Rachel Nostrant (22 Nov 2022) The scramble to rearm Ukraine is transforming NATO in a way that would've been hard without Putin's help
  129. ^ Patrick Tucker ( Why Defense Budgets Will Stay High After the Ukraine War "The war is exposing how European nations were underinvesting in defense, and the critical role that renewable energy will play in transatlantic security"
  130. ^ (23 Jan 2022) Ukraine receives second batch of U.S. weapons in Russian stand-off
  131. ^ Julie Coleman (1 Feb 2022) 'Putin should be afraid of us': Regular Ukrainian civilians are training to fight off a Russian invasion Training in Kharkiv and Kyiv
  132. ^ Helene Cooper (14 Jan 2022) U.S. Considers Backing an Insurgency if Russia Invades Ukraine
  133. ^ Michael Kofman and Rob Lee (2 Jun 2022) Not Built For Purpose: The Russian Military's Ill-Fated Force Decision Platoons on paper were half-sized in reality, leading to no dismounted infantry in motorized units.
  134. ^ Sebastien Roblin (21 Jan 2022) The ‘Georgia Model’: Russia’s Plan For Invading Ukraine?
  135. ^ a b c d Allegra Goodwin CNN in London (14 Nov 2022) Russia becoming a "pariah state," British PM Sunak says as he attends G20 summit UK Prime Minister "Sunak said it was 'telling' that Putin would not attend" G20 in Indonesia, in light of the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine.
    • Mark Galleoti (11 Nov 2022) Opinion: Putin can cling on to power, but his legend is dead "Multiple security forces balance each other: in Moscow, for example, the military garrison, a special division of the National Guard and the Kremlin Regiment, all report to different chains of command. The Federal Security Service watches all three – and the Federal Protection Service in turn watch them".
    • Simone McCarthy, CNN (18 Nov 2022) World leaders met all week to address global issues. Putin appears to no longer have a seat at the table "Putin ... is increasingly isolated".
  136. ^ Sergey Radchenko (22 February 2022) Moscow Musings on Brinksmanship From Stalin to Putin
  137. ^ Anton Troianovski (10 Sep 2021) Russia and Belarus inch closer to a full-blown merger
  138. ^ Michael Kofman (8 Sep 2021) Zapad-2021: What to Expect From Russia's Strategic Military Exercise
  139. ^ James Stavridis (11 Apr 2022) What the U.S. Military Needs to Learn from the Ukraine War
  140. ^ Alexander Bratersky (3 Sep 2021) Private companies at ‘Army 2021’ forum strive for survival as Russian military orders shrink
  141. ^ a b c Combat Approved (13 Feb 2021) Episode 44. The Uran-9 Russia’s First Combat Robot
  142. ^ a b Isabella Beltran (10 Apr 2021) Uran-9, Russian Robotic Tanks Slated to be Deployed "Soon" Despite Flaws During Syrian Tests, The Sciencetimes (Mixed-font I in 'science' appears deliberate.)
  143. ^ a b Sebastien Roblin (21 October 2019) This Is the Robot Tank Russia Used in Syria
  144. ^ Axx (14 Sep 2021) Russia one step ahead, Why Russia's strike robots is scary enough
  145. ^ Zvezda (TV channel) Воины будущего. Какими возможностями обладают поступившие на вооружение ВС РФ боевые роботы «Уран-9» Uran-9 Control system
  146. ^ a b Army Technology.com (2016) Uran-9 Unmanned Ground Combat Vehicle
  147. ^ James Crump (24 Aug 2021) Russia Orders Hypersonic Missiles As Putin Vows to Put Weapons on 'Combat Alert'
  148. ^ Alexander Marrow and Mark Trevelyan (Reuters) (13 Dec 2021) Russia says it may be forced to deploy mid-range nuclear missiles in Europe
  149. ^ Roger McDermott (7 Feb 2022) The Role of Hypersonic Weapons in Russian Military Strategy Giperzvukovogo Oruzhiya—(GZO); or Giperzvukovyye letatel’nyye apparaty—(GZLA) Kinzhal, Tsirkon, Kalibr, Poseidon, Avangard, Burevestnik, Sarmat,
  150. ^ a b The Moscow Times (1 September 2022) Russia Stages Scaled-down War Games With China, India
  151. ^ Paul McLeary (19 October 2022) NATO is rushing equipment to Ukraine as troops hunker down for the winter "The war begins a new phase as Russia launches missiles and temperatures fall"
  152. ^ Brian Bender and Laura Seligman (4 Dec 2022) "We haven't got this figured out just yet": Pentagon, industry struggle to arm Ukraine "The Russia problem takes center stage at this year's Reagan National Defense Forum".
  153. ^ Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. (7 March 2019) US ‘Gets Its Ass Handed To It’ In Wargames: Here’s A $24 Billion Fix Army prepositioned stocks (APS) vulnerability
  154. ^ Defense News (July 2019) Top 100 for 2019
  155. ^ Theresa Hitchens (31 July 2019) Competition (With China) IS The New Deterrence, US Military Leaders Say Vice Adm. David Kriete of US Strategic Command
  156. ^ aj.com (1 Oct 2019) China Confirms New Hypersonic Nuclear Missile On 70th Anniversary DF-17
    • Kristin Huang (23 Aug 2019) China’s hypersonic DF-17 missile threatens regional stability, analyst warns
    • (1 Oct 2019) China unveils Dongfeng-17 conventional missiles in military parade See minute 0:05 to 0:49 for 16 Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (white-tipped contrast atop their DF-17 fuselages mounted on booster rockets)
    • Kathrin Hille in Taipei and Qianer Liu in Beijing (1 Oct 2019) China displays military advances in show of strength to rivals Lists missile armaments. FT video FT estimates 1/3rd of China's missile arsenal is on display in 1 Oct parade
    • BILL POWELL (10/3/19) China's Hypersonic Missile, AKA 'Carrier Killers,' Are a 'Holy S**t Moment' for US Military
  157. ^ Bill Gertz (24 December 2019) China's test of sub-launched missile a threat to peace, retired captain warns JL-3 is an SLBM
  158. ^ Robert Burns (27 Aug 2020) Esper visit to tiny Palau highlights US-China competition
  159. ^ uscc.gov (Nov 2019) Chapter 4: China's Global Ambitions
  160. ^ David Kirton (30 Sep 2021) China's high-end military technology touted at biggest air show Airshow China in Zhuhai
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    • RFI posted on the Federal Business Opportunities, 4 April
    • Contract award: fourth quarter of FY21
    • preliminary design review (PDR) second quarter of FY23
    • first flight in the third quarter of FY24
    • critical design review (CDR) in the fourth quarter of FY24
    • fielding to first unit in second quarter of FY30
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    • John Vandiver (18 Feb 2022) US will sell Poland tanks to bolster NATO defense
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    1. Fuel and Ammunition Stockpiles
    2. Cyberwarfare
    3. GPS Jamming, Spoofing
    4. Attack submarine sorties
    5. Electronic warfare
    6. Social media blackout
    7. Little green men Events
    8. Drone reconnaissance
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External linksEdit

  • US Army Field Manual 100-10 Chapter 1: Power Projection
  • US Army Field Manual 100-7 Chapter 6: Force Projection