Schneider v. Rusk

Summary

Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964), was a 5–3 United States Supreme Court case that invalidated a law that stripped naturalized Americans of their citizenship as a result of extended or permanent residence abroad. Relying on the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the court ruled it generally was unconstitutional to treat naturalized and natural-born citizens differently.[1]

Schneider v. Rusk
Argued April 2, 1964
Decided May 18, 1964
Full case nameSchneider v. Rusk
Citations377 U.S. 163 (more)
84 S. Ct. 1187; 12 L. Ed. 2d 218; 1964 U.S. LEXIS 1275
Case history
PriorJudgment for defendant, 218 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1963); probable jurisdiction noted, 375 U.S. 893 (1963).
SubsequentNone
Holding
Naturalized U.S. citizens have the right to return to and reside in their native countries, and retain their U.S. citizenship, even if they never return to the United States.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Earl Warren
Associate Justices
Hugo Black · William O. Douglas
Tom C. Clark · John M. Harlan II
William J. Brennan Jr. · Potter Stewart
Byron White · Arthur Goldberg
Case opinions
MajorityDouglas, joined by Warren, Black, Stewart, Goldberg
DissentClark, joined by Harlan, White
Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. V

Background edit

Angelika Schneider, a German immigrant, came to the U.S. with her parents and became a United States citizen upon their naturalization at age 16. When she graduated from college, she moved back to Germany.

The State Department claimed Schneider had lost her U.S. citizenship in accordance with a section of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which revoked the citizenship of any naturalized citizen who returned to his or her country of birth and remained there for at least three years.

Opinion edit

The Supreme Court held that, since no provision of the law stripped natural-born Americans of their citizenship as a result of extended or permanent residence abroad, it was unconstitutionally discriminatory to apply such a rule only to naturalized citizens.

The opinion, however, noted the natural-born-citizen clause of the U.S. Constitution permitted naturalized and natural-born citizens to be treated differently with respect to who is eligible to serve as the president of the United States: "The only difference drawn by the Constitution is that only the 'natural born' citizen is eligible to be President".[2][3][4]

References edit

  1. ^ Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
  2. ^ "Hassan v. New Hampshire, Civil No. 11-cv-552-JD". casetext.
  3. ^ "Natural Born in the U.S.A.: The Striking Unfairness and Dangerous Ambiguity of the Constitution’s Presidential Qualifications Clause, and Why We Need to Fix It"
  4. ^ Malinda L. Seymore. "The Presidency and the Meaning of Citizenship," 2005 BYU Law Review 927 (2005)

Sources edit

  • Schneider v. Rusk: Great American Court Cases
  • The Supreme Court: Welcome Home TIME, May 29, 1964

External links edit

  •   Works related to Schneider v. Rusk (377 U.S. 163) at Wikisource
  • Text of Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964) is available from: Cornell  CourtListener  Findlaw  Google Scholar  Justia  Library of Congress  Oyez (oral argument audio)