Steven Shavell graduated from the University of Michigan in 1968. He obtained a Ph.D. in economics from MIT in 1973. Shavell is working on the economic analysis of law, including topics such as contracts, torts, property, criminal law, and legal process. He was a Guggenheim Fellow.

• Shavell, S., 1979. Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship. Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), pp. 55–73.
• Shavell, S., 1980. Strict liability versus negligence. Journal of Legal Studies, 9(1), pp. 1–25.
• Shavell, S., 1984. The design of contracts and remedies for breach. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99(1), pp. 121–148.
• Shavell, S., 1984. A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation. RAND Journal of Economics, 15(2), pp. 271–280.
• Shavell, S., 1987. A model of optimal incapacitation. American Economic Review, 77(2), pp. 107–110.
• Shavell, S., 1987. Economic Analysis of Accident Law. Harvard University Press.
• Shavell, S., 1991. Specific versus general enforcement of law. Journal of Political Economy, 99(5), pp. 1088–1108.
• Polinsky, A.M. and Shavell, S., 2000. The economic theory of public enforcement of law. Journal of Economic Literature, 38(1), pp. 45–76.
• Kaplow, L. and Shavell, S., 2002. Economic analysis of law. In Handbook of Public Economics (Vol. 3, pp. 1661–1784). Elsevier.
• Kaplow, L. and Shavell, S., 2007. Moral rules, the moral sentiments, and behavior: toward a theory of an optimal moral system. Journal of Political Economy, 115(3), pp. 494–514.

• Steven Shavell's website at Harvard Law School
• Steven Shavell's website at NBER
• Steven Shavell's website at IDEAS/RePEc